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The Impact of the Two Dispute 
Resolution Processes in Négociations 
A.V. Subbarao 
This paper attemps to answer the questions as to why 
the fédéral public servants alther their options from the ar-
bitration process to the conciliation process. 
The Public Service Staff Relations Act of 1967 introduced a system 
of collective bargaining in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service which 
provides for the resolution of a dispute either « (a) by the referral of 
the dispute to arbitration, or (b) by the referral, thereof, to a concilia-
tion board».1 In this paper, thèse two options are called the arbitra-
tion process and the conciliation process, respectively. Both thèse 
dispute resolution processes provide for the 'finality' of contract negotia-
tions.2 In the arbitration process, either or both of the negotiating 
parties may seek the intervention of the arbitration tribunal in the event 
of their negotiations resulting in an impasse, and the award rendered 
by the tribunal will be binding on both parties. In the conciliation 
process, if the parties fail to reach an agreement bilaterally, they can 
request the assistance of a conciliation board. The board submits a 
report if it fails to bring about a settlement between the parties and after 
seven days of receipt of the report, the employées are free to strike. 
Every bargaining agent certified under the Act3 is required to 
specify one of thèse two dispute resolution processes before serving 
notice on the employer to negoti-
ate. The process, once specified, is 
binding on the bargaining agent 
and the employer until the contract 
negotiations are settled. A bargain-
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1
 Public Service Staff in Relations Act, 1967. Section 36(1) (referred hereafter 
as PSSR Act). 
2
 Jacob FINKELMAN «Finality in Public Sector Bargaining: The Canadian 
Expérience», in Canadian Labour and Industrial Relations, H.C. Jain (éd.) McGraw-
Hill Ryerson Limited, Toronto, 1975, pp. 300-312. 
3
 PSSR Act, 1967. 
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ing agent, however, is allowed to alter its spécification of the dispute 
resolution process one month before commencement of the subséquent 
round of contract negotiations. Thèse two dispute resolution processes 
as well as their option to the bargaining agents are some of the unique 
features of the Canadian Fédéral Public Service System of collective 
bargaining.4 
During the first year of implementation (1967-68) of the Act, féd-
éral public servants in only four of the total of fifty-five bargaining 
units opted for the conciliation process and they constituted about 
twenty percent of the total employées in the Canadian Fédéral Public 
Service.5 By March 31, 1975, employées in 31 bargaining units constitut-
ing over one-third of the total fédéral public servants opted for the con-
ciliation process.6 But, by May 31, 1976, over two-thirds of the em-
ployées covered under the législation opted for the conciliations process 
and less than one-third remained in the arbitration process.7 This change 
in the number of employées opting for the arbitration process from about 
eighty percent during 1967-1968 to less than one third by May 31, 1976 
was caused by several bargaining groups who revised their spécifications 
from the arbitration to the conciliation process. Thèse altérations in 
spécification of dispute resolution processes during the first décade of 
4
 The Executive order 11491 which governs the employer-employée relations 
in the U.S. Fédéral Public Sector prohibits strikes by the fédéral government employées 
and permits binding interest arbitration of contract disputes only when the Fédéral 
Services Impasses Panel considers it necessary. In the rest of the U.S., public sector, 
strikes are permitted in only seven states and binding arbitration of contract disputes 
is allowed in less than half of the states. For a detailed discussion of the dispute resolu-
tion processes in the U.S. Public Sector, see, Thomas P. Gilroy and Anthony V. Sini-
cropi «Impasse Resolutions in Public Employment: A Current Assessment», Industrial 
and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 25 July 1972, pp. 496-511; Anthony V. Sinicropi, 
and Thomas P. Gilroy «The Légal Framework of Public Sector Dispute Resolution» 
The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 28, March 1973, pp. 1-13 and Robert E. Dunham «Interest 
Arbitration in Non-Fédéral Public Employment», The Arbitration Journal, Vol. 20, March 
1976, pp. 45-57. Strikes and binding interest arbitration of contract disputes are permitted 
in a number of Provincial jurisdictions in Canada and for détails see, Shirley B. Gol-
denberg «Dispute Settlement Législation in the Public Sector: An Interprovincial Com-
parison», in Canadian Labour and Industrial Relations, H.C. Jain (éd.), McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson Limited, Toronto, 1975, pp. 291-299. But the only provincial jurisdiction that 
provides for thèse two dispute resolution processes and their option to employées is 
in New Brunswick. Under the Public Service Labour Relations Act of 1968 in New Bruns-
wick, a bargaining agent has the option to choose between the conciliation process 
and the arbitration process, at the time when the contract negotiations reach an impasse. 
5
 Public Service Staff Relations Board, First Annual Report 1967-68. p. 36. 
6
 Public Service Staff Relations Board, Eighth Annual Report 1974-75, p. 118. 
7
 Treasury Board, Bargaining calendar, 1975. 
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implementation of collective bargaining in the Canadian Fédéral Public 
Service hâve attracted the attention of both policy makers and labor 
relations practitioners.8 But, there is very little research regarding the 
impact of thèse two dispute resolution processes on negotiations and 
outcomes.9 Until research is encouraged and the data are available to 
researchers,10 the question as to why the fédéral public servants alter 
their options from the arbitration process to the conciliation process is 
likely to remain unanswered and scientific évidence may not be forth-
coming. 
In this paper, an attempt is made to answer this research ques-
tion on the basis of a theoretical analysis of the impact of the two dis-
pute resolution processes on negotiations. In the first section of this 
paper, the two dispute resolution processes are briefly described and the 
employées' spécifications of thèse two processes are discussed. The 
second section contains a theoretical analysis on the impact of the 
arbitration and conciliation processes on negotiations. 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCESSES 
Irrespective of the dispute resolution process chosen, a bargaining 
agent and an employer are required to bargain in good faith and to 
make every reasonable effort to conclude a collective agreement. In 
order to help bargaining, the Pay Research Bureau11 provides the 
8
 Jacob FINKELMAN, Chairman of the Public Service Staff Relations Board 
was appointed to study the functioning of collective bargaining in the Canadian Fédéral 
Public Service. He made recommendations in a three-volume report which are being 
considered by a Spécial Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons. 
For détails, see L.W.C.S. Barnes and L.S. Kelly «A critical Evaluation of the Joint 
Parliamentary Report on Employer-Employée Relations in the Fédéral Public Service», 
The Labour Gezette, May 1976, pp. 256-259. 
9
 Interest arbitration in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service was analyzed in 
L.W.C.S. BARNES and L.A. KELLY, Interest Arbitration in the Fédéral Public Ser-
vice of Canada, Research and Current Issues Séries No. 31, Queen's University, King-
ston: Industrial Relations Centre, 1976, pp. 62 and in A.V. SUBBARO and Adishwar 
JAIN, Arbitration of wages in the Public Sector: The Case of the Canadian Fédéral 
Public Service, Working Paper No. 76-25, University of Ottawa, 1976. But a comparative 
study of thèse two dispute resolution processes is not so far undertaken. 
10
 This researcher would like to see more encouragement from the public sector 
agencies like the Treasury Board and, the Public Service Staff Relations Board, in terms 
of openness and availability of data. This researcher's efforts, twice, in the past, were 
not fruitful in getting coopération and data from thèse agencies. 
11
 For a detailed discussion of the functioning of the Pay Research Bureau, 
see Public Service Staff Relations Board, the Pay Research Bureau, March 1975. 
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employer and the bargaining agents engaged in contract negotiations 
with reports on rates of pay and conditions of employment prevailing 
at the time of negotiations, both within and outside the fédéral public 
service in Canada. If the parties seek and or if the Chairman of the 
Public Service Staff Relations Board12 (herein after referred as the 
Board) considers that the services of a mediator or a conciliator might 
help the parties in reaching an agreement, the Chairman makes avail-
able to the parties such an assistance. If the parties fail to conclude 
an agreement in spite of thèse efforts, then they are required to follow 
différent procédures for resolution of disputes in the two processes. 
Conciliation Process 
In the conciliation process, the bargaining agent or the employer 
or both may request the Chairman of the Board to appoint a concilia-
tion board for investigation and conciliation of the dispute. Before such 
a request is made the employer is required to submit a list of employées 
in the bargaining unit whose services are considered « essential », to the 
Chairman of the Board who, after considering the objections, if any, 
of the bargaining agent, détermines the list of «designated» employées. 
Designated employées are those who are not allowed to participate in 
a strike in the event of a bargaining agent organizing a strike following 
the breakdown of contract negotiations. 
After détermination of designated employées, the Chairman of the 
Board may appoint a conciliation board consisting of three members. 
The bargaining agent and the employer are each required to nominate 
a member to the conciliation board and the two members so nominat-
ed are required to sélect a third member who will serve as their chair-
man. If the parties fail to nominate their représentatives and or if the 
représentatives fail to sélect the third member within the stipulated time, 
the Chairman of the Board appoints the conciliation board. The Chair-
man of the Board then sets the terms of référence for the conciliation 
board which endeavours to bring about an agreement between the 
parties within fourteen days, after the receipt of the terms of référence 
or within such a longer period agreed upon by the parties or determined 
by the Chairman of the Board. Failing to bring an agreement, the con-
ciliation board submits a detailed report of its findings and recommenda-
12
 For a detailed discussion of the structure and functionning of the Public 
Service Staff Relations Board see A.G. Gillepsie, «Public Service Staff Relations 
Board», Relations Industrielles, Vol. 30 December 1975, pp. 628-41. 
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tions to the Chairman of the Board who, in turn, pro vides copies of 
the report to the parties for considération.13 
A conciliation board is prohibited from making any recommenda-
tion «concerning the standards, procédures or processes governing the 
appointment, appraisal, promotion, demotion, transfer, lay-off or release 
of employées».14 Such a restriction of issues, however, does not exist 
with regard to bilatéral collective negotiations. If the parties fail to settle 
within seven days after receipt of the conciliation board's report, the 
bargaining agent is free to déclare a légal strike. The parties may, how-
ever, negotiate during and after a strike for the purpose of concluding 
a settlement. 
Arbitration Process 
In the arbitration process, a bargaining agent has no right to strike. 
In the event of a failure to conclude an agreement through negotiations, 
the bargaining agent or the employer or both the parties may request 
the Chairman of the Board to refer their dispute to arbitration. The 
Chairman of the Board may do so and appoint an arbitration tribunal 
consisting of three members for resolving the dispute. Unlike the ad hoc 
conciliation board consisting of parties' nominees, the arbitration 
tribunal is appointed by the Chairman of the Board by drawing one 
member form each of the two permanent panels and one from among 
the membership of the Board who will be the chairman of the tribunal.15 
The members on the two panels are appointed by the Chairman of the 
Board for a fixed term specified under the Act, in consultation with 
the employer and the bargaining agents in the Canadian Fédéral Public 
Service. The tribunal renders an award after conducting arbitration 
proceedings giving opportunity to the parties' représentations, and the 
award will be binding on the parties. Unlike the case of the concilia-
tion board, there is no time limit within which the tribunal is required 
to render its award. With regard to the scope of arbitration, the tribunal 
13
 This is otherwise called the compulsory conciliation process which is an 
established procédure in the Canadian Private Sector labour relations. The functions of 
the conciliation board are more or less similar to those of the fact-finders in the U.S. 
public employment jurisdictions where they are required to submit reports with recom-
mendations. 
14
 PSSR Act, 1967. Section 86 (1). 
15
 Until the récent amendment to Section 67 of the PSSR Act in October 1975, 
the permanent chairman or the alternate Chairman of the Public Service Arbitration 
Tribunal used to be appointed as a Chairman of a tribunal constituted to arbitrate in 
each separate dispute. 
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is statutorily restricted and Its awards may only «deal with rates of pay, 
hours of work, leave entitlements, standards of discipline and other 
terms and conditions of employment directly related thereto».16 
In other words, there are significant différences between the two 
dispute resolution processes. First, the tribunals' awards are binding 
whereas the conciliation boards' recommendations are voluntary. 
Second, the coverage of issues is more restricted in awards than in the 
conciliation boards' recommendations or in the bilatéral settlements. 
Third, a conciliation board is required to submit its report within a 
stipulated time while there is no such time limit for the tribunal to render 
its awards. Fourth and final, the parties hâve an option to nominate 
their représentatives on each separate conciliation board whereas they 
hâve no such option in the appointment of an arbitration tribunal. 
Dispute Resolution Process Spécifications 
In spite of thèse différences between the two dispute resolution 
processes, a large majority of bargaining agents opted for the arbitra-
tion process upon initial certification. Recently, several bargaining 
groups revised their options from the arbitration to the conciliation 
process. It is interesting to note that ail thèse altérations took place 
among the 'central administration' employées who constitute about 
ninety-nine percent of the Canadian Fédéral Public servants.17 
Employées of the central administration are classified into five 
major occupational catégories, namely, the scientific and professional ; 
administrative and foreign service ; technical ; administrative support and 
operational.18 Each category, in turn, has a number of occupational 
groups and, in most cases, employées in an occupational group consti-
tute members of a bargaining unit. With respect to each bargaining 
unit, a bargaining agent is certified. Ail bargaining agents representing 
central administration employées negotiate with only one employer, 
namely, the Treasury Board. The Treasury Board is the single em-
ployer and is the chief spokesman of Her Majesty in the right of Can-
ada.19 
Différent bargaining agents negotiating with the 'single employer' 
might hâve had différent bargaining expériences which might hâve 
16
 PSSR Act, 1967 Section 70 (1). 
17
 Public Service Staff Relations Board, Eighth Annual Report 1974-75. pp. 110-
114. 
18
 PSSR Act, 1967. Section 2. 
19
 PSSR Act, 1967. Section 2. 
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influenced their récent changes in spécification of the dispute resolution 
process. Hence, the dispute resolution process spécifications of central* 
administration employées are discussed, first, in terms of their distribu-
tion in the five occupational catégories and, second, in terms of their 
représentation by différent bargaining agents. 
The bargaining groups that opted for the conciliation process upon 
initial certification were originally confined to the technical and opera-
tional catégories.20 In the technical category, The Air Traffic Controllers 
(2,164 employées) and the Electronics (2,917 employées) groups spe-
cified the conciliation process in 1967 and 1969, respectively. Among 
those groups in the operational category that opted for the conciliation 
process during 1967-68, the two Postal Opérations groups (19,278 in-
side workers and 16,702 outside workers) are the most significant and 
they both hold considérable bargaining power.21 
Between 1971 and 1975, several bargaining groups altered their 
dispute resolution process spécifications.22 Among them, altérations 
from the arbitration to the conciliation process by three groups were 
the most significant changes, so far made, in the Canadian Fédéral 
Public Service. Thèse are the General Labour and Trades; the Clérical 
and Regulatory and the Program Administration Groups. The General 
Labour and Trade groups (15,809 non-supervisory and 3,114 supervisory 
workers) of the operational category revised their spécification of the 
dispute resolution process in 1971. The Clérical and Regulatory Group 
(46,406 employées) of the administrative support category and the 
Program Administration group (20,715 employées) of the administrative 
and foreign service category altered their spécifications from the arbi-
tration to the conciliation process, respectively, on September 5, 1975 
and on October 10, 1975. 
As a resuit of thèse altérations, the percentage of employées that 
opted for conciliation in each of thèse three occupational catégories 
(shown in Table 1) is more than that which hâve chosen arbitration as 
the dispute resolution process. It is important to note in Table 1 that 
20
 Treasury Board, Bargaining calendar, 1975 
21
 There was no surprise in postal opérations groups opting for the conciliation 
process with the right to strike because they demanded, during their présentations 
before the Joint Parliamentary Committee in 1966, for inclusion of the right to strike, 
in the proposed législation. In fact, the Preparatory Committee on Collective Bargaining 
in the Public Service which was appointed by the Government of Canada in 1965 to 
study and report on the proposed législation, recommended only binding arbitration as 
a dispute resolution process. See Barnes and Kelly, Interest Arbitration in the Fédéral 
Public Service of Canada, 1976, p. 5. 
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the average size of a bargaining unit in the conciliation process is more 
than three times that in the arbitration process. This is because the 
large bargaining groups revised their options from the arbitration process 
to the conciliation process. 
Since the bargaining groups that opted for the conciliation process 
hâve the right to strike, they could not only threaten but could also 
organize a strike, if such an action is considered warranted during con-
tract negotiations with the Treasury Board. Some of the bargaining 
agents (See in Table 2), that represent employées in the conciliation 
process did in fact organize strikes in the past.22 The Public Service 
Alliance of Canada which represents employée groups in both dispute 
resolution processes organized a strike, for the first time, in 1975.23 
The altérations of dispute resolution processes and the actual organiz-
ing of strikes by some bargaining agents in the Canadian Fédéral Pub-
lic Service indicate that, perhaps, the employée organizations recog-
nized the important différences discussed below between contract 
negotiations with the right to strike and those without the right to strike. 
In the following section, a theoretical analysis of différences in negotia-
tions between thèse two dispute resolution processes is developed draw-
ing upon the gênerai théories of negotiations and bargaining. 
THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF NEGOTIATIONS 
Bilatéral negotiation is a process involving the exchange of infor-
mation between two parties. The purpose or intent of negotiations is 
to arrive at and to sign an agreement of understanding. But, when the 
parties involved in negotiations hâve opposing préférences, they are in 
direct conflict with one another and the negotiations are prolonged. In 
contract negotiations, labor and management are in conflict. Labor is 
interested in securing a settlement which it considers most acceptable 
to its membership and its leadership. Such a settlement may resuit 
in increased costs to the employer, who, in turn, is interested in ne-
gotiating an agreement involving the minimum labor costs to the orga-
nization. In such a conflict situation, the union may use the «threat 
22
 Treasury Board, Bargaining calendar, 1975. 
23
 Since 1967, there were 12 légal strikes in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service. 
For détails, see Treasury Board, Bargaining Calendar, 1975. Of those twelve, postal 
opérations groups organized a twenty one day strike in 1968, a rotating strike in 1970, 
and a seven week strike in 1975. In 1972, Air Traffic control group called a strike. 
For détails also see J. Finkelman Employer-Employée Relations in the Public Service, 
1976. p. 124. 
Bargaining agent 
TABLE 2 
Représentation or organized fédéral public employées by dispute 
resolution process as of may 31, 1976 
Arbitration process Conciliation process 
No. of bargaining Percentage of No. of bargaining Percentage of 
units total units total 
Public Service Alliance of Canada (PSAC) 
Professional Institute of The Public 
Service (PIPS) 
Canadian Union of Postal Workers 
(CUPW) 
Letter Carrier Union of Canada (LCUC) 
Canadian Postmasters Association (CPA) 
Association of Postal Officiai of Canada 
(APOC) 
Local 2228, International Brotherhood 
of Electrical Workers (IBEW) 
Fédéral Government Dockyards Trades 
and Labour Council (DTLC) 
Canadian Airtraffic Control Association 
(CATCA) 
Economists, Sociologists and 
Statisticians Associations (ESSA) 
Canadian Merchant Service Guild (CMSG) 
Council of Graphie Arts Unions of The 
Public Service of Canada (CGAU) 
Professional Association of The Foreign 
Service Officers (PAFSO) 
Total 
27 
20 
25.73 
4.71 
1.48 
51 
1.0 
0.50 
0.39 
33.81 30 
42.25 
2.13 
7.92 
6.86 
3.37 
1.20 
1.07 
0.89 
0.50 
66.19 
Percentage of 
total 
57.98 
6.84 
7.92 
6.86 
3.37 
1.48 
1.20 
1.07 
0.89 
1.0 
0.50 
0.50 
0.39 
100 
Source: Treasury Board, Bargaining calendar, 1976 
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of strike » tactic in order to cause management to make an offer closer 
to the union's preferred position. Faced with such a threat, the man-
agement is in a conflict — choice situation of either rejecting the union's 
demand and accepting a strike or accepting the union demand and 
increasing the cost to the organization. When the union threatens to 
strike, it, too, is in a conflict-choice situation of either striking and 
incurring the related costs or accepting the managements offer and in-
curring the «loss» of différence between its demand and the employer's 
offer. 
When bilatéral parties are in such a conflict-choice situation, 
Stevens24 suggests that the union and the management representratives 
may negotiate to seek a compromise settlement. In other words, the 
right to workstoppage permits the union to use the bargaining tactic, 
the 'threat to strike', which créâtes a conflict-choice situation for both 
negotiators. However, the déniai of the right to strike may create a 
non-conflict-choice situation which may subvert negotiations. In the ar-
bitration process, the parties hâve the right to arbitrate and while they 
do not hâve the « threat to strike » they may use the « threat of arbi-
tration». But, the behavioral question that needs to be answered is 
whether the 'threat of arbitration' would create a conflict-choice situa-
tion to bilatéral negotiators motivating them to negotiate freely towards 
a bilatéral settlement. 
A theoretical analysis applied to negotiations in the Canadian 
Fédéral Public Service is developed using annual wage increase as a sole 
bargaining issue. It is assumed that for a given contract period, the 
Treasury Board estimâtes a «wage bill» out of which wage increases 
will be negotiated and settled with ail the bargaining agents. It is also 
assumed that the purpose of negotiations for each bargaining agent is 
to negotiate not only for a large share of the wage bill but also for in-
creasing the wage bill so that more money will be left for it and/or 
other bargaining agents. And, for the Treasury Board the purpose is to 
negotiate as small a part of the wage bill as possible with a particular 
bargaining agent representing a bargaining unit so that a larger share of 
it will be available for negotiations with respect to other bargaining 
units. 
Following the analogy of the utility maximization function of the 
bilatéral negotiators, the Treasury Board (herein after referred as the 
employer) and a particular bargaining agent representing a bargaining 
24
 C M . STEVENS, «On the Theory of Negotiations». Quaterly Journal of 
Economies, Vol. LXXII, February 1958, pp. 77-97. 
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unit (herein after referred as the union) are expected to attempt to 
maximize their utilities along q^  and q2, respectively, (see Figure 1) on 
the utility frontier 'M' which, in this case, is the total wage bill. If the 
union demands q2 a sum equal to 'M' and/or if the employer prefers 
to keep ql for negotiations with respect to other bargaining units, they 
are fated to remain deadlocked. In such a situation, either of the parties 
will hâve to give in completely to the opponent for a seulement to take 
place and it is very unlikely to happen. More realistically, the bargainers 
are visualized as confronting one another with some rather initially 
extrême positions, UD and ED, respectively. At UD on the utility 
FIGURE 1 
M — WAGE BILL 
UD — UNION'S INITIAL POSITION 
ED — EMPLOYER'S INITIAL POSITION 
q0q2 UNION'S INITIAL POSITION 
q0q, — EMPLOYER'S UTILITY SCALE 
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frontier 'M' , the union demands to receive for its membership the entire 
wage bill less the amount equal to the utility space q22,q2, anc* UD. 
Similarly, at ED, the employer prefers to keep for the purpose of ne-
gotiations relating to other bargaining units the entire wage bill less the 
amount equal to the utility space (\lVq1 and ED. 
At its initiale position UD, the union expects to receive q22 
utilities for itself on the q0q2 utility scale, with the employer getting 
only q2i on the employer's utility scale ( q ^ ) . At its initial position ED, 
the employer expects to receive qn utilities for itself, with the union 
getting only q12 on the union's utility scale. When the parties face such 
a situation, they hâve three alternatives open, namely: 
1. to accept the others position and avoid conflict ; 
2. to concède marginally off of one's own position and hopefully 
avoid conflict ; and 
3. to stick to one's own position and risk conflict. 
A party's sélection of the option may be influenced by the dispute 
resolution process the bargaining agent has selected before the com-
mencement of contract negotiations. Analysis of negotiations in the con-
ciliation process will be discussed first and the discussion of negotia-
tions in the arbitration process will follow. 
Analysis of Negotiations With The Right To Strike 
In the conciliation process, since the union has the right to strike, 
it can impose a cost of disagreement on the employer.25 Given the 
assumption, Zeuthen's theory,26 discussed below, goes far to explain 
whether or not either party will concède to the demand of the other 
by introducing the concept of a subjective probability of conflict. Ac-
cording to Zeuthen, the maximum subjective probability of conflict (ci) 
the union would be willing to endure in order to hold its position at 
UD and the maximum subjective probability of conflict (c2) the employer 
would be willing to endure in order to hold its position at ED — are 
derived as follows : 
I. The union would receive q12 with certainty if it conceded to the 
employer's terms and it would receive q22 ( l - c t ) if it maintained its 
25
 Neil W. CHAMBERLAIN and James W. KUHN, Collective Bargaining 
(Second Edition) New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1965, p. 173. 
26
 F. ZEUTHEN, Problems of Monopoly and Economie Warfare, London: 
G. Routledge and Sons, 1930, 152, pp. 
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own position, where Ci is the trade union's subjective probability es-
timate that the employer will not accept its terms. Accordingly: 
(a) if q12 < q22 (1-c, ), the union will stand firm since the expected 
gain from doing so is greater than the expected gain associated with 
a concession ; and 
(b) if q12 ^ q22 (1-c.i), then the union will concède. 
Using (a) and/or (b) above to solve for Ci it is relatively simple 
to dérive the maximum subjective probability of conflict that the union 
would be willing to accept — 
C l = q?2 ~ qj2 
q.22 
II. The employer would receive q21 with certainty if it conceded 
to the union's terms and it would receive qn ( l-ç2) if it maintained 
its own position, where c2 is the employer's subjective probability 
estimate that the union will not accept its terms. Accordingly: 
(a) if q21 < ( l-c2) , then the employer would stand firm since the 
expected gain from doing so is greater than the expected gain associated 
with a concession ; and 
(b) if q21^qu ( l -c2) , then the employer will concède. 
Using (a) and/or (b) above for c2 it is relatively simple to dérive 
the maximum subjective probability of conflict that the employer would 
be willing to accept — 
C 2 = q n - q 2 i 
Qn 
Zeuthen theorized if Ci < c2, then the union would be observed 
conceding; whereas, if c2 < ct, then the employer would be observed 
conceding. Both parties would concède when c2 = cu until the (qnq21) 
= (q12q22) at which point they may settle. Based on this concept of 
the subjective probability of conflict, Pen27 developed a theory of bar-
gaining in which he, too, analyzed the parties' concessionary behavior 
during bilatéral negotiations. Bishop,28 also, developed a composite 
theory of bargaining by combining Zeuthen's concept of the subjective 
27
 J. PEN «A General Theory of Bargaining». American Economie Review, Vol. 
XLII, March 1952, pp. 24-42. 
28
 R.L. BISHOP «A Zeuthens-Hicks Theory of Bargaining». Econometrica, 
Vol. 32 July 1964, pp. 410-417. 
230 INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS INDUSTRIELLES, VOL. 32, NO 2 
probability of conflict and Hicks'29 concepts of the time dimensions 
of conflicts and agreements. Like ci and C2 in Zeuthen's theory, si 
and S2 in the composite theory are used to explain the bilatéral nego-
tiators' concessionary behavior, where si is the maximum length of 
strike the union would be willing to sustain in order to hold to its posi-
tion of UD and S2 is the maximum length of strike the employer would 
be willing to withstand in order to hold to its position of ED. 
Most of thèse bargaining théories are based on the assumption 
that the «threat of workstoppage» créâtes a conflict-choice situation 
to both the employer and the union engaged in bilatéral negotiations. 
In conflict-choice situations, Stevens30 states that the parties tend to 
avoid both négative goals (i.e., conceding to the opponent or maintain-
ing a rigid position and potentially causing a breakdown in relations) 
and prefer to pursue a compromise solution. In the public sector col-
lective bargaining also, the threat of a strike may create a conflict-
choice situation in which the parties may be motivated to concède and 
compromise rather than face the conséquence of going without salaries 
from the union's point of view or employées' services to the public 
from the employer's point of view. 
Analysis of Negotiations Without the Right to Strike 
In the arbitration process, the 'threat of arbitration' may create 
a 'conflict-choice' situation provided that it has the same or somewhat 
similar effect on the negotiators as the «threat of strike». / / t h e 'threat 
of arbitration' does not impose a cost on the opponent and if the op-
ponent does not expect a serious risk, a conflict-choice situation may 
not be created. The cost of arbitration to a party is the différence be-
tween its position and the expected award. The greater the 'uncertainty' 
of the award in an arbitration System, the larger is likely to be the 
expected cost of arbitration to a party. According to Stevens31, the 
différence between the party's position and its expected award is more 
likely to influence negotiations than the mère 'threat of arbitration' by 
the opponent. In other words, in an arbitration System in which the 
award is 'uncertain', the «threat of arbitration» like the 'threat of 
strike' may create a conflict-choice situation. 
29
 J.B. HICKS The Theory ofWages (Second Edition) London: MacMillian and 
Co. 1963 338 pp. 
30
 C M . STEVENS, «On the Theory of Negotiations». Quaterly Journal of 
Economies, Vol. LXXII, February 1958, pp. 77-97. 
31
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The arbitration System in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service is 
similar to what is sometimes called the conventional System of binding 
interest arbitration in which the arbitrators more or less split the dif-
férence between the parties.32 In such a system, the arbitral award is 
more or less 'certain'. A union which demands initially q22 and is offered 
qi2 (see Figure 1) can expect to receive an award more or less equal 
to ^&2 âi^Similarly, the employer demanding qn and offered qn 
can expect to receive an award équivalent to ^ ^ ^rOi j n other 
words, the 'certainty' of award may create a non-conflict-choice situa-
tion in which the parties may not be motivated to negotiate (i.e. con-
cède and compromise) for the purpose of reaching an agreement. 
However, in the arbitration process, the Treasury Board and 
some bargaining agents may hâve reached agreements during contract 
negotiations. They may hâve settled because of the pattern bargaining 
which may hâve been practiced by the two bargaining agents that re-
present employée groups in both the dispute resolution process (see 
Table 2). The Public Service Alliance of Canada and the Professional 
Institute of Public Service may hâve relied upon their settlements in 
the conciliation process as patterns during contract negotiations in the 
arbitration process. The Treasury Board which is a party to settlements 
in the conciliation process may hâve yielded to some bargaining agents' 
demands based on intraoccupational comparisons within the Canadian 
Fédéral Public Service. Such settlements based on pattern bargaining 
may hâve frustrated some bargaining groups who, perhaps, on realiza-
tion of their bargaining power may hâve revised their options from the 
arbitration process to the conciliation process. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The theoretical analysis indicates that there are significant différ-
ences in negotiations between the two dispute resolution processes. 
32
 Gary LONG, and Peter FEUILLE «Final-Offer Arbitration: 'Sudden 
Death' in Eugène» Industhal and Labor Relations Review, Vol. 27 January 1974, pp. 
186-203. 
33
 Research évidence indicates that the conventional binding and compulsory 
interest arbitration has a 'chilling' and 'narcotic' effect on bilatéral negotiations. See 
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Vol. 14, October 1975, pp. 302-310 and Hoyt WHEELER, «Compulsory Arbitration: 
A 'Narcotic Effect'?». Industrial Relations, Vol. 14, February 1975, pp. 117-120. 
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With the 'threat of strike' the employée organizations that optecl for the 
conciliation process, perhaps, are able to negotiate 'freely' with the 
Treasury Board. During negotiations, the Treasury Board may be con-
ceding to those unions that threaten to strike. With the resuit, a large 
portion of the 'wage bih" may be committed to the employée groups in 
the conciliation process. The employée groups that opted for the arbitra-
tion process may be left with a relatively small portion of the 'wage 
bill'. Their efforts to increase the size of the 'wage bill' may not be 
successful with the Treasury Board. Since thèse employée groups are 
prohibited to strike and can only seek arbitration, the Treasury Board 
may adopt a bargaining strategy of offering as little as possible and may 
make very few concessions during negotiations. As a resuit, negotia-
tions may end in a stalemate and the parties may seek arbitration. 
If the arbitration tribunal renders an award contrary to the ex-
pectations of the union and if such an award affects the interests of its 
membership,34 the union is likely to be frustrated and may blâme the 
tribunal for the outcome. With the resuit, a union which can strike 
with impunity35 against a public employer may be able to convince 
its membership to revise their option from the arbitration process to 
the conciliation process. 
Thèse theoretical différences in impact on negotiations between the 
two dispute resolution processes need to be tested in terms of actual 
34
 In its décisions, the tribunal seems to be attempting to hold the wage levels 
in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service. Such décisions may go not only against the 
expectations of the unions but also against the interests of the employées that opted 
for the arbitration process. For example, in a wage dispute between the Treasury Board 
and the Physical Sciences Group in the Scientific and Professional Category, the Arbi-
tration Tribunal was not only influenced by the guidelines set in the Canadian Fédéral 
Government's Anti-Inflation Act of 1975 but also adhered, according to its own following 
statement, to the trends in the Anti-Inflation Board's décisions: 
«This Board (tribunal) is in no position to détermine... the maximum permis-
sible increase in salary compensation. The fact is that the AIB requires the 
calculation to be made in a manner shown by the Treasury Board and that 
this method of determining the maximum permissible increase in compensation 
has been applied in ail disputes coming before the Arbitration Tribunals of 
the Public Service Staff relations Board. It would be unwise for this Board 
to vary that approach in the instant case ». 
For détails, see File No. 185-2.132 of the Public Service Staff Relations Board in which 
the instant award, issued on October 21, 1976, was recorded. 
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collective bargaining in the Canadian Fédéral Public Service. If such 
tests confirm this theoretical analysis, those results may be of use to 
the policy makers who may want to legislate the dispute resolution 
processes that would be more compatible with free collective bargaining 
than those existing now under the Public Service Staff Relations Act. 
Stevens states that the final-offer-sélection System of binding interest 
arbitration may create a conflict-choice situation and hence, it may be 
compatible with free collective bargaining.36 
Les conséquences du mécanisme de solution des conflits 
Au niveau fédéral, les employés régis par la Loi des relations de travail dans la 
fonction publique, sont obligés d'indiquer, avant de donner la mise en demeure de né-
gocier, s'ils optent pour le recours à l'arbitrage ou pour la conciliation avec droit de 
grève en vue du règlement du conflit si les négociations aboutissent à une impasse. 
Pendant la première année d'application de la Loi, (1967-1968), environ quatre-vingts 
pour cent des employés qui y étaient assujettis ont choisi le recours à l'arbitrage. Par 
la suite, plusieurs groupements de négociation ont révisé leur option avec le résultat que, 
au 31 mai 1976, moins du tiers des fonctionnaires fédéraux recouraient encore à l'ar-
bitrage, alors que les autres avaient choisi la conciliation avec droit de grève. 
L'analyse théorique des négociations suivant ces deux modes de règlement des 
conflits indique que le recours à la conciliation avec droit de grève crée une situation 
où l'on choisit le conflit alors que le recours à l'arbitrage crée une situation où l'on 
écarte l'idée de conflit. Lorsqu'elles choisissent la situation de conflit, les parties sont 
disposées à faire des concessions et des compromis, alors que, lorsque l'état de conflit 
est éliminé, elles peuvent bien se refuser à négocier directement et sérieusement pour 
en arriver à une entente. En conséquence, il se peut bien que les groupes de négocia-
tion qui avaient opté pour le régime de l'arbitrage se soient sentis frustrés dans leurs 
expériences de négociation et qu'ils se soient orientés vers le régime de conciliation 
avec l'espoir, à cause de leur droit de faire la grève, de pouvoir négocier librement avec 
le Conseil du Trésor. 
36
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